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With the development of environmental psychology, psycholo-
gists have paid increasing attention to the importance of privacy
and the means of attaining it.1 The concept of privacy is also of
significance in other social science disciplines; notably, cultural an-
BA., Virginia; MA, Ph.D., Boston University. Associate Professor of Psy-
chology and Law, and Director of Law/Psychology Program, University of Ne-
braska-Lincoln. Acknowledgment is given to the following colleagues for
their comments on an earlier draft of this manuscript: Martin Gardner, Chris-
topher Slobogin, Ross Thompson, and Walter Wadlington.
1. Environmental psychology is the subdiscipline of psychology concerned with
the relationship between behavior and the physical environment. Psycholog-
ical studies of privacy thus developed from an analysis of people's experience
of private spaces and of intrusions into that privacy. See, e.g., Altman, Pri-
vacy: A Conceptual Analysis, 8 ENV'T & BEHAV. 7 (1976); Kelvin, A Social-
Psychological Examination of Privacy, 12 BRT. J. Soc. & CLINICAL PSYCHOi-
OGY 248 (1973); Privacy as a Behavioral Phenomenon, 33(3) J. Soc. IssuEs 5
(S. Margulis ed. 1977); Proshansky, Ittelson, & Rivlin, Freedom of Choice and
Behavior in a Physical Setting in ENVIRONMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY: MAN AND
HiS PHYSICAL SETTInG 173 (H. Proshansky, W. Ittelson, & L. Rivlin eds. 1970).
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thropology,2 sociology,3 and architecture. 4 Indeed, an entire mono-
graph developed with support from the National Science
Foundation's Law and Social Science Programs was devoted to a
bibliography of social science research related to privacy.5 At the
same time, however, there has been minimal consideration given
to the potential integration of this literature with legal doctrines
related to privacy rights.6
This Article is intended to facilitate such an integration with
respect to the privacy interests of minors. Such an emphasis is
particularly timely in view of contemporary efforts to explore the
psychological assumptions underlying legal and philosophical
analyses of the nature of children's rights.7 Indeed, the cases re-
viewed in this Article suggest that the jurisprudence of privacy in
childhood and adolescence has also relied on psychological as-
sumptions, although generally not assumptions concerning the
psychology of privacy. The thesis of this Article is that a more sys-
tematic examination of the significance of privacy for minors, both
psychologically and ethically, would result in a more coherent and
more humane policy of respect for children's personhood. Before
considering such a focus in detail, however, it is necessary to dis-
cuss in general terms the nature of privacy.
I. THE NATURE OF PRIVACY
A. Privacy as a Psychological Concept
The relative lack of attention devoted to an integration of psy-
chological and legal concepts of privacy can probably be attributed
2. For example, see the studies cited in Altman, Privacy Regulation: Culturally
Universal or Culturally Specific? 33(3) J. Soc. ISSUES 66 (1977).
3. See, e.g., E. GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1959).
4. See, e.g., Archea, The Place of Architectural Factors in Behavioral Theories of
Privacy, 33(3) J. Soc. IssUEs 116 (1977).
5. H. LATIN, PRIVACY: A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY AND TOPICAL INDEX OF SOCIAL
SCIENCE MATERIALS (1976).
6. There have been several notable exceptions to this general lack of attention.
See A. WESTIN, PRrVACY AND FREEDOM (1967) (implications of technological
developments enabling greater physical and psychological surveillance);
Levin & Askin, Privacy in the Courts: Law and Social Reality, 33(3) J. Soc.
ISSUES 138 (1977) (an analysis of social facts raised in litigation on privacy
issues, particularly with respect to fourth amendment claims); Ruebhausen &
Brim, Privacy and Behavioral Research, 65 COLUm. L. REV. 1184 (1965) (pri-
vacy issues raised in personality testing and personality research).
7. E.g., CHILDREN'S COMPETENCE TO CONSENT (G. Melton, G. Koocher, & M. Saks
eds. 1983); G. MELTON, CHILD ADVOCACY: PSYCHOLOGICAL ISSUES AND INTER-
VENTIONS (1983); THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN: LEGAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PER-
SPECTrVES (J. Henning ed. 1982); The Changing Status of Children: Rights,




to two factors: (1) the narrowness of legal topics in which psychol-
ogists have been interested;8 and (2) the complexity of the con-
cept, both psychologically and legally. Psychologists have tended
to focus their work in a few legal areas (e.g., mental health law,
juries, and criminal law). Those who might venture into the psy-
chological analysis of privacy interests are likely to find a confus-
ing array of issues.
Even as a psychological concept alone, privacy entails a com-
plex set of phenomena. At a minimum, three broad and rather dis-
parate concerns (i.e., bodily privacy, management of access to
personal space, and management of access to personal informa-
tion) are subsumed under the rubric of privacy. Moreover, each of
these concerns has both negative and positive dimensions, analo-
gous to the general concepts of negative and positive rights.9 That
is, each type of privacy concern involves an interest in both free-
dom from invasion of privacy and freedom to exercise privacy.
Furthermore, in neither case is the expression of privacy necessar-
ily a conscious act. In both instances, people may often actively
experience privacy only when it is in danger, although at other
times individuals may make active, conscious efforts to induce and
maintain privacy (e.g., going somewhere to be alone or locking a
letter in a file drawer). Thus, there are at least three types of pri-
vacy concerns, each with positive ("freedom to") and negative
("freedom from") aspects, which may or may not involve self-con-
scious behavior and experience.10
8. See Lob, Psycholegal Researck: Past and Present, 79 MicH. L. REV. 659 (1981);
Monahan & Loftus, The Psychology of Law, 33 ANN. REV. PSYCHOLOGY 441
(1982).
9. Cf. T. BEuNDrrr, RIGHTs 65-69 (1982) (comparing negative rights and rights to
beneficience).
10. The conceptualization of privacy presented here is based on the nature of the
"zones" or interests of privacy protectech body, territory, and information. A
somewhat different conceptualization has been offered by Laufer and Wolfe.
See Laufer & Wolfe, Privacy as a Concept and a Social Issue: A Multidimen-
sional Developmental Theory, 33(3) J. Soc. Issurs 22 (1977). They describe
three dimensions of privacy which they believe may vary systematically
across privacy experiences: self-ego dimension (privacy in the context of per-
sonal individuation), id. at 26; environmental dimension (elements of the so-
cial context, including "cultural meanings, the interaction between the social
arrangements and the physical settings, and the stage of the life cycle"), id.
at 28; and interpersonal dimension ("[plrivacy, in whatever form, presup-
poses the existence of others and the possibility of a relationship with
them"), id. at 33.
The Laufer/Wolfe conceptualization is useful as a theoretical framework
for the analysis of the elements-both situational and phenomenological-of
various privacy experiences. While perhaps not as rich, the three-part con-
cept of privacy interests presented here probably has more potential for anal-
ysis of psychological aspects of various legal doctrines of privacy. To the
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The first concern to be discussed is bodily privacy, including
privacy of mind."1 As noted above, this privacy interest includes
both negative and positive freedoms: respectively, (1) protection
from intrusion into one's body and into the privacy of one's
thoughts; and (2) control of decision making concerning one's
body and mind. In the former case, there is a negative interest in
maintaining freedom from intrusions into one's physical self. In
the latter case, there is a positive interest in maintaining freedom
to do what one wishes with one's body. The basic notion in both
instances is that respect for the integrity of the person demands
protection of personal control over the physical boundaries of the
body. Privacy in this context is reflected in cultural (and legal)
norms with respect to privacy governing the expression of sexual-
ity and physical intimacy.
Second, privacy entails management of the physical space over
which one feels actual or legitimate control. This form of privacy is
reflected in the now well-established concept of personal space.12
Management of personal space also has positive and negative as-
pects: (1) the freedom to establish territorial boundaries; and
(2) protection from intrusion into the territorial zones over which
one feels legitimate control.
Third, privacy includes management of access to information
about oneself. Society recognizes certain contexts (e.g., psycho-
therapy or a personal diary) and content (e.g., details of one's sex-
ual behavior or one's personal income) which are legitimately
private; that is, in which cultural norms-and sometimes legal
extent that these interests are analogous to foci of legal protection, research
on a specific interest might be more easily applied to the law.
11. Privacy of the mind was articulated in Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir.
1980) (involuntarily committed patients have a right to refuse "mdnd-affect-
ing" antipsychotic drugs), remanded on other grounds sub nom. Mills v. Rog-
ers, 102 S. Ct. 2442 (1982), although the Court could not determine its exact
origin:
We begin our analysis with what seems to us to be an intuitively
obvious proposition: a person has a constitutionally protected inter-
est in being left free by the state to decide for himself whether to
submit to the serious and potentially harmful medical treatment that
is represented by the administration of antipsychotic drugs. The pre-
cise textual source in the Constitution of the protection of this inter-
est is unclear, and the authorities directly supportive of the
preposition itself are surprisingly few. Nevertheless, we are con-
vinced that the proposition is correct and that a source in the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment for the protection of
this interest exists, most likely as part of the penumbral right to pri-
vacy, bodily integrity, or personal security.
634 F.2d at 653.
12. See, e.g., R. SOMMER, PERSONAL SPACE: THE BEHAVIORAL BASIS OF DESIGN




norms-proscribe violation of personal control over information.
Here again there are positive and negative freedoms involved:
(1) the maintenance of active decisional control over the disclo-
sure of personal information contained in documents or known by
other parties; and (2) protection from nonconsensual examination
of such information.
Complicating the concept of privacy further is the fact that, be-
sides involving widely disparate behaviors and contexts, privacy is
both interpersonal and phenomenological. On the one hand, pri-
vacy in all of its forms involves interpersonal transactions in which
norms of privacy apply. Thus, privacy can be defined in terms of
social situations. Of particular importance in the present discus-
sion is that normative expectations of privacy vary not only with
physical and social setting but also with social status. Clearly the
dependent status of children leaves them especially vulnerable to
restricted norms of privacy.
Psychological concepts of privacy must also take into account
its experiential (phenomenological) aspects. While situations may
be more or less reflective of a social consensus that privacy should
exist, this situational/normative definition may not correspond
with the individual's experience or intent. This discrepancy may
be particularly common for children, because (1) the perception
may require complex social discriminations, and (2) adults in con-
trol may restrict children's opportunities for privacy. Indeed, the
experience of privacy-as well as social definitions of private situa-
tions-is likely to differ appreciably for children from that of
adults. For example, as Professors Laufer and Wolfe have noted,
aloneness for young children is often not volitional (i.e., the result
of an active exclusionary process), but it may nonetheless come to
signify privacy.13 Besides experiencing physical separation from
others (perhaps a precursor to individuation), "the child, left
alone, has the opportunity to experience privacy in ways other
than physical aloneness, that is, as quiet, as thinking alone, as be-
ing able to do what he/she wants."14
Notwithstanding the complexity of the psychological concept of
privacy, even as applied only to adults, it should be noted that
there are certain commonalities across types of privacy. Professor
Altman, for example, has conceptualized privacy as the "selective
control [desired or achieved] of access to the self or to one's
group."15 Privacy also involves management of interpersonal
transactions in order "to enhance autonomy and/or to minimize
13. Laufer & Wolfe, supra note 10, at 27.
14. Id.
15. Altman, supra note 1, at 8.
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vulnerability," as Professor Margulis has noted.16 While Margu-
lis's definition fails to differentiate adequately between privacy
and liberty as existential phenomena, his conceptualization does
imply the common ethical basis of various forms of privacy.
Whether the control is over one's physical self, one's physical
territory and possessions, or one's sensitive concerns and exper-
iences, privacy is predicated on respect for the integrity of the per-
son. Without respect for the boundaries of a person (both physical
and psychological), there can be little recognition of the existence
of the individual as an autonomous member of the community.
In conceptualizing privacy (or perhaps the lack thereof) in
childhood, it is important to keep this underlying ethical theme in
mind. It is reasonable to hypothesize that definitions of psycholog-
ical and physical zones or privacy for children would vary with the
degree to which children are consensually defined as autonomous
members of the community,17 a social classification which has
been both historically and culturally relative 8 and about which
there has been great ambivalence in law.19 Analyses of the psy-
chology of privacy in childhood may be facilitated, therefore, by
consideration of the roles and status of children in various con-
texts and of the interaction of such expectations with the "true"
maturational level of the child.
B. Privacy as a Legal Concept
Given the diverse situations in which claims of privacy (as that
term is used colloquially and as it is used by psychologists) may be
raised, it is hardly surprising that there is not a direct correspon-
dence between psychological and legal concepts of privacy. One
legal commentator has even gone so far as to distinguish privacy
"as an existential condition" from its legal counterpart: "privacy
per se remains primarily a nonpolitical and nonlegal concept."2 0
Even the most casual observer of the law need only leaf through
Professor Latin's bibliography of social science research on pri-
vacy 2 ' to discern the substantially broader scope of psychological
than of legal concepts of privacy. Professor Latin includes, for
16. Margulis, Conceptions of Privacy: Current Status and Next Steps, 33(3) J.
Soc. IssuEs 5, 10 (1977).
17. Cf. Worsfold, A Philosophical Justification for Children's Rights, 44 HARv.
EDUC. REV. 142 (1974) (applying Rawlsian theory of respect for persons to
children).
18. G. MELTON, supra note 7, ch. 9.
19. Melton, Children's Competence to Consent: A Problem in Law and Social Sci-
ence, in CHILDREN'S COMPETENCE TO CONSENT 1-11 (1983); see generally R.
MNOOKn, CinLD, FAmmy, AND STATE (1978).
20. D. O'BRIEN, PRIVAcY, LAW, AND PuBUc PoLIcY 25 (1979).
21. H. LATN, supra note 5.
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example, studies of population density, self-disclosure as a person-
ality trait, and "experimentally aroused feelings of undistinctive-
ness."22 Such topics, while perhaps being highly relevant to an
understanding of the dynamics of privacy, are at most vaguely tan-
gential to the law of privacy and indeed are properly beyond the
scope of legal regulation, at least on privacy grounds alone.
Even within the narrower confines of legal privacy, the three
broad concerns identified previously (i.e., bodily privacy, manage-
ment of personal space, and management of access to personal in-
formation) are engulfed in a complicated web of legal doctrines.
Privacy interests are implicated, at a minimum, in the fourth,23
fifth,24 and first 25 amendments, in a variously-derived constitu-
tional right to privacy per se,26 and in various statutes 27 and com-
mon-law doctrines 28 governing the control of information. The
relationships among these doctrines are not altogether clear.29
Nonetheless, the legal philosopher need not strain very hard to
find a common underlying principle. Analogous to the ethical/psy-
chological principle of respect for the integrity of the person or the
self, legal privacy seems predicated on protection of the individual
from state interference in his or her life where such intervention is
not based on compelling (or at least rational) justification.30 This
principle was eloquently articulated by Warren and Brandeis
nearly a century ago3 ' and reiterated in Justice Brandeis' oft-cited
22. Id. at 20.
23. The fourth amendment protects people from "unreasonable searches and
seizures" and therefore guards legitimate expectations of privacy from gov-
ernment intrusion. See infra notes 119-29 and accompanying text.
24. "Privacy involves the choice of the individual to disclose or to reveal what he
believes, what he thinks, what he possesses .... That dual aspect of privacy
means that the individual should have the freedom to select for himself the
time and circumstances when he will share his secrets with others and de-
cide the extent of that sharing. This is his prerogative, not the State's." War-
den v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 323 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (footnote
omitted).
25. See generally O'BRIEN, supra note 20, ch. 4.
26. See infra notes 37-45 and 101 and accompanying text.
27. E.g., Privacy Act of 1974, § 552a, 5 U.S.C. 552a (1976 & Supp. V 1981); Family
Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, § 438, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (1976 &
Supp. V 1981); Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, § 605, 15 U.S.C. § 1681c (1976
& Supp. V 1981).
28. Warren and Brandeis's famous construction of the right to be let alone was
based on privacy claims in tort law. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy,
4 HARv. L. REV. 193 (1890), reprinted in A. BRECKENREDGE, THE RIGHT TO PRi-
VACY 133 (1970).
29. The relationship between the fourth and fifth amendments is one such unset-
tled topic. See, e.g., O'BRiEN, supra note 20, at 105-10.
30. Cf. Pound, Interests of Personality, 28 HARv. L. REV. 343 (1915).
31. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 28.
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dissent in Olmstead v. United States32 almost three decades later.
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions
favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of
man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that
only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfaction of life are to be found in
material things. They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their
thoughts, their emotions, and their sensations. They conferred, as against
the Government, the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of
rights and the right most valued by civilized men.
3 3
While Justice Brandeis' view may have lacked elegance as a ju-
dicial construction, 34 his view does reflect the ideals of privacy em-
bodied in the American political system for adults. However, for
those for whom autonomy is not assumed, interests in "being let
alone" must be balanced against their presumed need for care and
protection. Consequently, while "neither the Fourteenth Amend-
ment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone,"3 5 it is well estab-
lished that the state as parens patriae may intervene in the affairs
of children in ways that would be clearly unconstitutional for
adults.3 6
Indeed, some may argue that the key privacy interests for chil-
dren are those involved in family privacy.37 Professors Goldstein,
Freud, and Solnit, for example, have contended that children have
a primary interest in noninterference in parental decision making
and the preservation of the sanctity of the family based on the chil-
dren's supposed need for seemingly omnipotent parents and the
state's lack of effectiveness as a surrogate parent.3 8 While this
view is certainly arguable,3 9 the point is that for some commenta-
tors, minors' privacy interests are interchangeable with the par-
ents' privacy interests. It is parents, they argue, who should be let
alone; parents in turn should be able to rear their children as they
32. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
33. Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
34. Cf. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAmiF. L. REV. 383 (1960) (tort of invasion of privacy is
actually several independent torts in a "state of bewildered confusion").
35. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967).
36. See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); id. at 673 (Fortas, J., dis-
senting); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
37. Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
(right to abortion), cited three cases concerned with state encroachment on
child rearing (Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Pierce v. Society
of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)) in
support of his analysis of the constitutional right to privacy.
38. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD, & A. SOL'rr, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD 8-9 (1979). For a similar view not based on psychoanalytic theory, see
Baumrind, The Principles of Reciprocity: Development of Prosocial Behavior
in Children, 19(4) EDUC. PERsPs. 3 (1980).
39. Cf. Melton, Children's Rights: Where Are The Children?, 52 Am. J. ORTHoPsY-
cmATY 530 (1982) (children have independent psychological interests).
[Vol. 62:455
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see fit, short of gross abuse and neglect. Therefore, the independ-
ent privacy interests of children and, accordingly, the legally rele-
vant psychological issues may be quite limited. In discerning the
points at which psychological analyses may be useful in under-
standing minors' privacy, it is important to examine the privacy
rights of minors which have in fact been given judicial
consideration.
I. JUDICIAL CONSIDERATION OF PRIVACY
IN CHILDHOOD
A. Bodily Privacy
A constitutional right to privacy was first recognized by the
Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut.40 In overturning a
Connecticut statute prohibiting the use of contraceptive devices
and the distribution of information concerning their use, the Court
found a right to privacy in the "penumbras" of express constitu-
tional guarantees. Writing for the majority, Justice Douglas traced
the right of privacy as a fundamental right implicit in several of the
Bill of Rights:
[Previous] cases suggest that specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have
penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give
them life and substance .... Various guarantees create zones of privacy.
The right of association contained in the penumbra of the First Amend-
ment is one .... The Third Amendment in its prohibition against the
quartering of soldiers "in any house" in time of peace without the consent
of the owner is another facet of that privacy. The Fourth Amendment ex-
plicitly affirms the "right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures."
The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the citizen
to create a zone of privacy which government may not force him to surren-
der to his detriment. The Ninth Amendment provides: '"The enumeration
in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people."
4 1
In later cases, the Supreme Court further explicated the right to
privacy as applying particularly in matters related to reproduction.
In Eisenstadt v. Baird,42 the Court invalidated a Massachusetts
statute that made it illegal for single persons, but not married per-
sons, to obtain contraceptives. In his opinion for the Court, Justice
Brennan emphasized that, "[ijf the right of privacy means any-
thing, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free
from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so funda-
mentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or be-
40. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
41. Id. at 484 (citations omitted).
42. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
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get a child."43 Similarly, in Roe v. Wade,44 the Supreme Court
sustained a constitutional challenge to a Texas law, making the
procurement or performance of abortion a crime. However, in the
opinion for the Court, Justice Blackmun did little to clarify the na-
ture of the right to privacy. He noted merely that it has "some ex-
tension" to matters of marriage, reproduction, and family
relationships and that the right could be founded in the concept of
personal liberty embedded in the fourteenth amendment.4 5 He
made no effort to distinguish "privacy" and "liberty" and conse-
quently made no distinction between privacy analysis and the
more traditional substantive due-process analysis.
Thus, while the origin of the right to privacy remains somewhat
unclear, it is clear that it does exist. Furthermore, in cases con-
cerning minors' rights of access to abortion and contraceptives, the
Court has had the occasion to consider the applicability of this
right of privacy to minors. The first such case was Planned
Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth,46 in which the Court
considered the constitutionality of a Missouri statute requiring pa-
rental consent before a minor could obtain an abortion. Writing for
a sharply divided Court,47 Justice Blackmun concluded that state
interests in the protection of the family and parental autonomy
were outweighed by the minor's privacy interests:
It is difficult . . . to conclude that providing a parent with absolute
power to overrule a determination, made by the physician and his minor
patient, to terminate the patient's pregnancy will serve to strengthen the
family unit. Neither is it likely that such veto power will enhance parental
authority or control where the minor and the nonconsenting parent are so
fundamentally in conflict and the very existence of the [minor daughter's]
pregnancy already has fractured the family structure. Any independent
interest the parent may have in the termination is no more weighty than
the right of privacy of the competent minor mature enough to have be-
come pregnant.4 8
There were two important qualifications in Justice Blackmun's
43. Id. at 453. Justice Brennan's explication of the substantive nature of privacy
may have been dicta. The key issue in the case was with respect to the appli-
cation of the equal protection clause.
44. 410 U.S. at 113.
45. Id. at 152-53.
46. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
47. Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Powell, wrote separately to indicate that
they would find statutory provisions for parental consultation acceptable,
provided that parental approval were not an absolute condition for a minor
obtaining an abortion. In separate dissents, Justices Stevens and White, the
latter joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, suggested that
parental consent requirements were justifiable means of protecting minors
from what the dissenters felt were likely to be "immature and improvident
decisions." 428 U.S. at 95 (White, J., dissenting).
48. 428 U.S. at 75.
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analysis, however. First, it was implied that the standard to be
used in determining whether limitations on minors' privacy rights
are permissible is less stringent than the "compelling state inter-
est" standard normally used when fundamental rights are in-
fringed for state purposes.49 The issue in Danforth appeared to be
merely whether a "significant state interest" was supported by the
parental consent requirement.50 Second, the Court noted that its
holding "does not suggest that every minor, regardless of age or
maturity, may give effective consent for termination of her preg-
nancy."5 ' Thus, the Danforth decision left open the possibility of
establishing requirements of involvement, short of absolute veto,
by parents or other third parties in minors' abortion decisions, pro-
vided that the state could provide significant justification for such
limitations on minors' privacy. Moreover, the Court expressly es-
tablished a mature minor rule52 without providing guidance as to
the elements of "maturity."5 3
These points have been reiterated in a series of Supreme Court
cases concerning the extent to which states may limit minors' pri-
vacy when dealing with abortion and contraception. For example,
in H.L. v. Matheson,54 the Court held that states may constitution-
ally require physicians to notify parents if their daughter requests
an abortion, at least insofar as such a law is applied to immature,
unemancipated minors living with and dependent on their par-
ents.5 5 In the opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Burger argued
that such a statute serves the legitimate state purposes of preser-
vation of family integrity, protection of adolescents, and "providing
an opportunity for parents to supply essential medical and other
information to a physician."56 The dissenters in Matheson cor-
rectly noted that it is unclear what relevant information the pa-
tient's parents could provide that she could not.57
49. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
50. 428 U.S. at 75. See also City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive
Health, 103 S. Ct. 2481, 2491 n.10 (1983); Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431
U.S. 678, 693 n.15 (1977).
51. 428 U.S. at 75.
52. Cf. Wadlington, Minors and Health Care: The Age of Consent, 11 OSGOODE
HAmL Li. 115, 117-20 (1973) (describing the development of mature minor
standard for consent to medical care).
53. See Melton, supra note 19, for more extensive discussion of these points.
54. 450 U.S. 398 (1981).
55. The Supreme Court has since made clear in dicta that a parental notice re-
quirement applied to mature minors seeking abortions would be unconstitu-
tional. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 103 S. Ct. 2481,
2499 n.31 (1983).
56. 450 U.S. at 411.




The Chief Justice's opinion rested on a series of empirical as-
sumptions, some of them of dubious validity on their face. Starting
from a premise of unity of interests between parents and child,58
Burger contended that parental consultation may be necessary to
provide the minor with guidance in "a decision that has potentially
traumatic and permanent consequences."59 He further asserted
that there are grave risks associated with abortions in adolescence;
risks which he contended do not exist in pregnancies carried to
term:
The medical, emotional, and psychological consequences of an abortion
are serious and can be lasting; this is particularly so when the patient is
immature.
... If the pregnant girl elects to carry her child to term, the medical
decisions to be made entail few-perhaps none-of the potentially grave
emotional and psychological consequences of the decision to abort.
6 0
Little or no evidence was given to support these assumptions. In-
deed, it appears that Chief Justice Burger would be unable to find
empirical evidence to support his assumptions.
1. Psychological Questions
As Chief Justice Burger's opinion in Matheson illustrates, the
Supreme Court's emphasis on maturity and the accompanying low
threshold (i.e., significant state interest standard) for permissible
qualifications of minor's privacy rights in abortion and contracep-
tion decisions have made psychological harm a key concern in ado-
lescent abortion cases.6 1 Indeed, Danforth and its progeny raise
several specific psychological questions:
(a) How competent are adolescents in making decisions about
abortion? The majority of the Supreme Court have made clear
their belief that pregnant adolescents are likely to arrive at poorly
58. Id. at 409-10.
59. Id. at 412.
60. Id. at 411-13 (footnote omitted).
61. Similar issues are raised when considering the effects of restrictions on mi-
nors' access to contraceptives. In considering such issues, the Supreme
Court has failed to find evidence supporting the existence of legitimate state
purposes in banning sales of contraceptives to minors under age 16. Carey v.
Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 695-96 (1977).
These concerns are also relevant to regulation recently adopted by the De-
partment of Health and Human Services, 42 C.F.RL § 59 (1983), prohibiting
federally funded family-planning clinics from distributing contraceptives to
minors without parental notice. Enforcement of this regulation has been en-
joined because of administrative overreaching. Planned Parenthood Federa-
tion of America, Inc. v. Schweiker, 51 U.S.L.W. 2518 (D.D.C. Feb. 18, 1983);
New York v. Schweiker, 51 U.S.L.W. 2518 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 1983).
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reasoned decisions about abortion.62 At the same time, however,
there is research suggesting that adolescents are no less compe-
tent than adults in making decisions about health care matters.63
Without citing such research, Justice Marshall in his dissent in
Matheson asserted that the "undoubted social reality" is that
"some minors, in some circumstances, have the capacity and need
to determine their health care needs without involving their par-
ents."64 Arguably, though, the abortion decision is sufficiently un-
usual in its social and moral dimensions as to make such general
observations of adolescent decision making in health care inappli-
cable. In the only study to examine specifically the decision mak-
ing of minors regarding abortion, Catherine C. Lewis found little
difference between the rationale given by minors and adults for
their decision to have or not to have an abortion.65 The differences
which did exist (i.e., minors' greater reliance on others' opinions)
were reflective of the differences in situations in which minors and
adults are likely to find themselves. While this study tends to
show that minors are relatively competent to make decisions con-
cerning abortion, further research is needed in this area, even
though such research is inherently difficult to perform.66
62. See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622,640 (1979); Planned Parenthood of Cen-
tral Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 91 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 95
(White, J., dissenting).
63. See Grisso & Vierling, Minors' Consent to Treatment: A Developmental Per-
spective, 9 PROF. PSYCHOLOGY 412 (1978); Lewis, Decision Making Related to
Health: When Could/Should Children Act Responsibly?, in CHILDREN'S COM-
PETENCE TO CONSENT 75 (G. Melton, G. Koocher, & M. Saks eds. 1983); Melton,
Children's Participation in Treatment Planning: Psychological and Legal Is-
sues, 12 PROF. PSYCHOLOGY 246 (1981); Weithorn, Developmental Factors and
Competence to Make Informed Treatment Decisions, in LEGAL REFORMS AF-
FECTING CHILD AND YOUTH SERVICES 85 (G. Melton ed. 1982).
64. 450 U.S. at 453 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (dissent joined by Brennan and
Blackmun, JJ.).
65. Lewis, A Comparison of Minors' and Adults' Pregnancy Decisions, 50 Am. J.
ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 446 (1980).
66. Such research by its nature presents ethical dilemmas which are difficult to
resolve. Given the sensitive nature of such research and the stress which the
minors are presumed to be under at the time, it would be important to have
safeguards to ensure that the research does not add additional stress. At the
same time, it would violate privacy further to seek parental consent for the
research. The problem may be resolved by permitting minors to consent to
research concerning conditions for which they could legally seek medical or
psychological attention without parental consent. See Additional Protections
For Children Involved as Subjects in Research, 45 C.F.R. § 46(D) (1983).
In view of Justice Powell's concern about minors' ability to exercise good
judgment in choosing a physician, Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 640 (1979),
any future research on maturity or competence in decision making about
abortion should include this aspect of the process as well as reasoning about
the abortion decision itself.
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(b) Can "maturity" be reliably and validly assessed?67 By its
reliance on a mature minor standard, the Supreme Court has im-
plicitly concluded that such a standard is a practical one. If profes-
sionals responsible for counseling adolescents about abortions are
unable to differentiate adequately between mature and immature
minors, the distinction made by the Court is useless. The mean-
ingfulness of research on the question is dubious until the Court
clarifies factors to be considered in calculating maturity.68 In any
case, no research on the assessment of maturity in abortion cases
is available at this point in time.
(c) What are the psychological effects of abortion on adoles-
cents, and how do they compare with the effects of carrying a preg-
nancy to term? Available evidence concerning medical risks of
pregnancies carried to term indicates that the Chief Justice's san-
guine view of the latter is clearly misplaced. Teenagers are no
more likely than older women to suffer complications as a result of
abortion. Moreover, the risk of death from pregnancy continuation
is five times higher for teenagers than the mortality rate associated
with abortion.69
The data on psychological risks are less clear and less extensive
67. Reliability (the stability of measurement) and validity (the accuracy of mea-
surement) are cornerstones of psychometric evaluation. See A. ANAsTASI,
PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING (1976); Green, A Primer of Testing, 36 AM. PSYCHOL-
OGIST 1001 (1981).
68. In its most recent abortion cases, the Supreme Court again failed to provide
much guidance as to the meaning of "mature." The case of City of Akron v.
Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 103 S. Ct. 2481 (1983), suggests that a
purely age-graded rule is insufficient; rather, a case-by-case determination is
necessary. The majority indicated that, "it is clear that Akron may not make
a blanket determination that all minors under the age of 15 are too immature
to make this decision .... ." Id. at 2498. The companion case of Planned
Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 103 S. Ct. 2517 (1983), does little to clarify the
issue. In Ashcroft, at issue was a Missouri statute which provides that a mi-
nor may "self consent" if the judge finds that she is mature, based on evi-
dence of "the emotional development, maturity, intellect, and understanding
of the minor." Id. at 2526. Although the Court upheld the statute, it did not
indicate why this inquiry satisfies the constitutional requirement of protect-
ing the privacy of mature minors.
The ambiguity which now exists as to the elements of the mature minor
standard leaves physicians and counselors with an uncomfortable dilemma
in states with a parental-notice requirement. On the one hand, they may be
subject to criminal penalties for failing to notify an immature minor's parents
of their daughter's request for an abortion. On the other hand, the state may
not constitutionally require parental notice if the minor is mature, and the
health professional is given no clear guidance as to how to determine matur-
ity. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
69. Cates, Abortions for Teenagers, in ABORTION AND STERaZrTION: MEDICAL
AND SOCIAL ASPECTS 139 (J. Hodgson ed. 1981).
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because of attrition rates in follow-up studies, inconsistencies of
definition, and other methodological flaws. 70 In any case, there is
no evidence to support the Chief Justice's contention in Matheson
that psychological consequences of abortion are "markedly more
severe" for adolescents than for adults.71 One of the two articles
cited by the Chief Justice to support his assertion was in fact an
account of psychoanalytic impressions of thirty cases of teenage
pregnancy.7 2 Besides lacking methodological rigor, that report had
nothing to do with cases of abortion. The more valid studies show
that severe emotional responses to abortion are very rare. For ex-
ample, a recent analysis of health registry data in Denmark for
1975 found only five admissions to psychiatric hospitals of females
aged nineteen or under who had had an abortion within the past
three months, compared with a total of 4375 young women who had
had an abortion.7 3
In terms of short-term psychological sequelae of abortion, most
researchers have reported the predominant response to be happi-
ness and relief. 74 Such a reaction was observed, for example, in a
recovery-room study of 489 patients at a New York clinic who had
undergone an abortion.75 Although that study did find younger wo-
men to have significantly less positive reactions to the abortion,
age accounted for less than eight percent of the variance.7 6
In short, while more and better-designed research is needed,
there is little evidence to support the Chief Justice's assumption of
serious negative emotional effects of abortion on adolescents. In-
deed, the evidence points in the opposite direction, particularly
when the stresses associated with unwanted parenthood are
considered.
(d) Whom do adolescents typically consult in making abortion
decisions? Data are lacking on this question at least insofar as
studies of girls who actually obtain abortions are concerned.
70. See David & Friedman, Psychosocial Research in Abortion: A Transnational
Perspective, in THE ABORTION EXPERIENCE: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND MEDICAL IM-
PACT 311 (H. Osofsky & J. Osofsky eds. 1973); David, Rasmussen, & Holst, Post-
partum and Postabortion Psychotic Reactions, 13 FAM. PLAN. PERSPS. 88
(1982) [hereinafter cited as David].
71. 450 U.S. at 411, n.20.
72. Babildan & Goldman, A Study in Teen-age Pregnancy, 128 Am. J. PSYCHOLOGY
111 (1971).
73. David, supra note 70, at 89.
74. Osofsky, Osofsky, & Rajan, Psychological Effects of Abortion: With Emphasis
upon Immediate Reactions and Followup, in THE ABORTION EXPERIENCE:
PSYCHOLOGICAL AND MEDICAL IMPACT 188 (1973).
75. Bracken, Hachamovitch, & Grossman, The Decision to Abort and Psychologi-
cal Sequelae, 158 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 154 (1974).
76. Id. at 156-59.
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Among girls who carry pregnancy to term, however, parents are
among the last confidants to be informed of the pregnancy; rather,
boyfriends are preferred sources of advice and support.77 Minors
are less likely than adults to include professionals as persons
whom they expect to consult.78
(e) Does a parental notice requirement change the paths of
consultation which pregnant adolescents follow? Does a parental
notice requirement result in more or less reasoned abortion deci-
sions? A parental notice or consultation requirement is supporta-
ble only if it actually results in parental involvement. Moreover,
unless the requirement is defensible solely as support for the fam-
ily as a unit, such a requirement would be constitutional only if it
also results in more reasoned abortion decisions. Otherwise no
significant state purpose is served.
The majority of the Supreme Court assumes such a positive ef-
fect (at least for immature, unemancipated minors).79 There are
as yet no outcome data on the impact of statutes such as the one
involved in Matheson.8 0 However, there is reason to hypothesize
that parental notice requirements will have the effect of lowering
the probability of minors carefully weighing the risks and benefits
of an abortion.
First, adolescents already tend to delay decisions concerning
abortions,81 such that the decision to abort, if ultimately made, will
be accompanied by greater risks. In fact, the decision may be
delayed until a full-term pregnancy is accomplished regardless of
whether it would be in the minor's best interests. It is reasonable
to predict that parental notice requirements will make it more
likely that pregnant teenagers will delay their decisions (rather
than inform their parents) to the point where a decision has effec-
tively been made without any real consideration.
Second, given evidence that mother-daughter discussions of
sexual matters are still far from universal,82 it seems likely that
even assuming the intended parental consultation takes place, de-
cisions-whether for or against an abortion-will often be made
impulsively without real discussion. It has already been noted
that pregnant teenagers tend to avoid talking with their parents
77. J. ALLEN, MANAGING TEENAGE PREGNANCY: ACCESS TO ABORTION, COmTaA-
CEPTION, AND SEX EDUCATION (1980).
78. Lewis, supra note 65, at 448.
79. See supra note 62.
80. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-304 (1978). See supra text accompanying notes 54 and
55.
81. Bracken & Kasl, Delay in Seeking Induced Abortion: A Review and Theoreti-
cal Analysis, 121 Am. J. OB. & GYN. 1008 (1975).
82. See infra note 84 and accompanying text.
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when they learn or suspect they are pregnant. Furthermore, this
avoidance is not unique to the pregnancy itself. Only sixty-one
percent of mothers of pregnant adolescents and forty-five percent
of pregnant adolescents themselves report having had a mother-
daughter discussion of birth control.83 Studies of mother-daughter
communication among general samples of nonpregnant adoles-
cents and their parents are even less encouraging. Among a strati-
fied random sample of mothers of ten- to eighteen-year-olds in
Cincinnati, only 31.5% reported giving their daughters reading ma-
terial about sex, while 36.7% reported having explained inter-
course, and only half had discussed birth control.8 4 Not
surprisingly, therefore, children indicated that they received most
of their knowledge about sex from friends and teachers. It would
be surprising to find that this view of sex as a forbidden topic
should suddenly turn toward open and detailed discussion of the
options available to a pregnant adolescent.
2. Conclusions
It is clear that the limits of privacy rights in abortion decisions
for minors have been predicated on a series of empirical assump-
tions, most of them psychological. Moreover, the low standard of
judging the constitutionality of abridgment of these rights ensures
that psychological risk-benefit analysis will be a continuing feature
of adolescent abortion cases. However, it is noteworthy that the
abortion cases have been remarkably free of psychological as-
sumptions about privacy per se. The question of whether a repro-
ductive privacy right is applicable to minors is a "legal" issue,
which does not require an analysis of whether minors experience
privacy (in a phenomenological sense) or even if they regard such
an experience as desirable or important. Such an analysis might
conceivably have some legal relevance, but only as a mediating
step. There might be interest in privacy per se if the maintenance
of privacy qua privacy could be shown to have positive effects (e.g.,
decrease the probability of depression) or if intrusion into privacy
could be shown to have negative effects (e.g., increase the
probability of depression). Regardless, it is clear that the legal
concept of privacy in reproductive decisions does not necessitate
any relationship with psychological privacy, except insofar as a so-
cial consensus is necessary to place the topic within a zone of pri-
vate or sensitive matters.
It is also clear that much of the psychological discussion which
83. Furstenberg, Birth Control Experience Among Pregnant Adolescents: The
Process of Unplanned Parenthood, 19 Soc. PRoBs. 192, 197 (1971).
84. Rothenburg, Communication About Sex and Birth Control Between Mothers
and their Adolescent Children, 3 POPULATION & ENV'T 35, 39 (1980).
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has taken place in adolescent abortion cases has focused on the
decision-making process. This is not surprising in view of the fact
that the Supreme Court has emphasized the importance of repro-
ductive autonomy and privacy in decisions about abortion and con-
traception.8 5 While perhaps implicit, there has been little
discussion of protection from intrusions into bodily privacy.
This discrepancy is probably a result of the way in which cases
are typically framed. Abortion cases almost invariably arise as the
result of an attempt to limit access to abortions rather than as the
result of an attempt to compel an abortion against the wishes of
the patient. 86 Therefore, there has typically been a positive rather
than a negative interest at stake. Nonetheless, until the Supreme
Court clearly differentiates reproductive privacy from decisional
autonomy, only the minor's interests in the decision itself (includ-
ing perhaps a non sequitur that autonomy, hence such an interest,
flows from competence87 ) will likely be the focus of analysis.
B. Informational Privacy
Besides reproductive privacy, a constitutional right to privacy
for minors has also been asserted with regard to control over per-
sonal information, particularly vis-a-vis state authorities. This
question was considered in Merriken v. Cressman,88 a federal dis-
trict court case which has stimulated unusually wide commen-
tary89 because of the important but seldom litigated issues it
raised.90
85. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 nn.24-26 (1977).
86. But see, In re Smith, 16 Md. App. 209, 295 A.2d 238 (1973).
87. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 649-50 (1968) (Stewart, J., con-
curring).
88. 364 F. Supp. 913 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
89. Bersoff, Children as Participants in Psychoeducational Assessment 153-58, in
CHILDREN'S COMPETENCE TO CONSENT 149, 153-58 (G. Melton, G. Koocher, & M.
Saks eds. 1983); Bersoff, Children as Research Subjects: Problems of Compe-
tency and Consent, in THE RIGHTs OF CHILDREN: LEGAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVES (J. Henning ed. 1982); Moskowitz, Parental Rights and State
Education, 50 WASH. L. REv. 623 (1975); Note, Constitutional Law-Right of
Privacy-School Program Designed to Identify and Provide Corrective Ther-
apyfor Potential Drug Abusers Held Unconstitutional, 2 FORDHAM URB. LJ.
599 (1974); Recent Cases, Constitutional Law--Right of Privacy-Personality
Test Used by School to Identify Potential Drug Abusers Without Informed
Consent of Parents Violates Student's and Parents' Right of Privacy, 27 VAND.
L. REV. 372 (1974), Recent Developments, Education-School-instituted Pro-
gram to Identify Potential Drug Abusers-Right to Privacy, 13 J. FAm. L. 619,
636 (1973-74).
90. Besides raising important questions about privacy of family and child, the
authority of school officials, the ethics of early intervention programs, and
requirements for consent to evaluation, Merriken is perhaps unique as a dis-
coverable case of "malresearch" in the behavioral sciences. See Keith-Spie-
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Merriken developed from attempts by the Norristown, Penn-
sylvania, Area School District to institute a drug-abuse prevention
program called Critical Period of Intervention (CPI) in the junior
high school. CPI was planned as a two-step program: (1) adminis-
tration of a personality test purported to identify potential drug
abusers; and (2) compulsory intervention, including confronta-
tional group therapy programs, for students identified as potential
drug abusers. The personality test included:
such personal and private questions as the family religion, the race or skin
color of the student... the family composition, including the reason for
the absence of one or both parents, and whether one or both parents
"hugged and kissed me good night when I was small," "tell me how much
they love me," "enjoyed talking about current events with me," and "make
me feel unloved."!91
Students and teachers were also encouraged to identify students
whose behavior they perceived to be inappropriate. 92
CPI intended to use this data to form, by its own admission, a
"massive data bank" with dissemination of personal information
about specific students to a host of school personnel, including "su-
perintendents, principals, guidance counselors, athletic coaches,
social workers, PTA officers, and school board members."9 3 More-
over, as the district court observed, there was no guarantee that
the information could be kept secret from community authorities
(like "an enterprising district attorney") who have subpoena
power.94 Taking note of the expert testimony by two child psychia-
trists, the court also described the risks of a self-fulfiling prophecy
of drug use by "potential drug users" and of scapegoating by peers
of students who refused to take the CPI test or who obtained a
user's proffle. 95
While the scientific merit of CPI was questionable, the most
glaring problem with the program was the inadequacy of the con-
sent procedures. When the program was first instituted, the school
officials planned merely a "book-of-the-month-club" solicitation in
which silence was interpreted as consent.96 After the suit was
filed, the format was changed to obtain "affirmative written paren-
tal consent," but without providing any information about the risks
associated with the CPI program.9 7 Initially, there was no provi-
gel, Children and Consent to Participate in Research, in CHMLDREN'S
COMPETENCE TO CONSENT 179, 181 (G. Melton, G. Koocher, & M. Saks eds.
1983).




95. Id. at 915.
96. Id. at 914.
97. Id. at 914-15.
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sion at all for consent from students. After litigation began, the
test was modified to allow students to return a blank question-
naire, but no provision was made for affirmative informed
consent.98
In analyzing the case, the district court judge, John Morgan Da-
vis, made it clear that "[t]he fact that the students are juveniles
does not in any way invalidate their Constitutional right to pri-
vacy."99 Indeed, he went further and asserted that "the right to
privacy is on an equal or possibly more elevated pedestal than
some other individual Constitutional rights and should be treated
with as much deference as free speech."1 0 0 The court also found
that the "highly personal" nature of the information sought by the
CPI came within the range of concerns protected by the right to
privacy:
These questions go directly to an individual's family relationship and his
rearing. There probably is no more private a relationship, excepting mar-
riage, which the Constitution safeguards than that between parent and
child. This Court can look upon any invasion of that relationship as a di-
rect violation of one's Constitutional right to privacy.1 0 1
However, after recognizing a constitutional right to privacy for
minors and implying a violation thereof, Judge Davis stopped short
of holding that the lack of the students' consent to the invasion of
their privacy would invalidate the program. The court expressly
avoided the question of whether parents may waive their chil-
dren's right to privacy.l0 2 Moreover, the court also declined to rule
on what was really a second issue: whether the lack of consent by
the child was sufficient to render the CPI program constitutionally
infirm. (What would have been the result if, for example, Mrs.
Merriken supported the program but her son objected to the inva-
sion of his personal privacy?). Instead, the court concentrated on
the parents' personal interests:
In the case at Bar, the children are never given the opportunity to con-
sent to invasion of their privacy; only the opportunity to refuse to consent
by returning a blank questionnaire. Whether this procedure is Constitu-
tional is questionable, but the Court does not have to face that issue be-
cause the facts presented show that the parents could not have been
properly informed about the CPI Program and as a result could not have
given informed consent for their children to take the CPI test.10 3
In the final analysis, psychological issues played a great part in
deciding whether the Norristown schools should be enjoined from
proceeding with the CPI program. Judge Davis reasoned that if
98. Id.
99. Id. at 918.
100. Id.
101. Id.




the public need for the program was great and the invasion of indi-
vidual privacy was minimal, then the program might still pass con-
stitutional muster.104 However, in Merriken, the school officials
failed to substantiate the effectiveness of the CPI program in meet-
ing state purposes:
The Court, in balancing the right of an individual to privacy and the
right of the Government to invade that privacy for the sake of public inter-
est, strikes the balance in favor of the individual in the circumstances
shown in this case. In short, the reasons for this are that the test itself and
the surrounding results of that test are not sufficiently presented to both
the child and the parents, as well as the Court, as to its authenticity and
credibility in fighting the drug problem in this country. There is too much
of a chance that the wrong people for the wrong reasons will be singled
out and counselled in the wrong manner.1 0 5
Thus, having previously found a substantial invasion of Mrs.
Merriken's privacy, the court ultimately rested its judgment on an
empirical psychological question: whether the program resulted in
a decrease in student drug use, without identifying students
falsely. The lack of evidence as to the psychometric validity of the
test and the effectiveness of the interventions planned for students
who were identified as potential users removed any question as to
the program's unconstitutionality. As in abortion cases, the weight
given the right to privacy in Merriken was decided in part on psy-
chological assumptions, but not assumptions having to do with the
psychology of privacy.
A second case concerning government intrusion into the infor-
mational privacy of youth is Paton v. La Prade.1O6 Although Paton
is based on different legal doctrines than Merriken, it is particu-
larly noteworthy in the present context because counsel for the
plaintiff, Professor Askin of the Rutgers Constitutional Litigation
Clinic, introduced psychological evidence to substantiate harm of
invasion of privacy.l0 7
In Paton, the plaintiff, Lori Paton, was a sixteen-year-old high
school student enrolled in a social studies course called "Left to
Right" which examined contemporary political ideologies. As part
of an assignment for the course, Paton wrote a letter to the Social-
ist Labor Party in order to obtain information about its platform.
104. Id. at 920-21.
105. Id. at 921.
106. 524 F.2d 862 (3d Cir. 1975).
107. The same tactic was used by Professor Askin in Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1
(1972), to substantiate the plaintiff's claim that military surveillance of civil-
ians resulted in a chill of protected speech. A summary of opinions of a panel
of social scientists on the matter was appended to the brief presented to the
Supreme Court. The Court found the evidence irrelevant, however. See As-




However, she inadvertently addressed the letter to the Socialist
Workers Party (SWP).108 On orders from the director of the FBI,
the Postal Service had placed a mail cover upon the headquarters
of the SWP in New York City. Accordingly, a postal employee re-
corded Paton's name and address and forwarded her name to the
New York FBI office.' 09 The New York FBI office informed the
Newark office that Paton had been in "contact" with the SWP.
Lacking any further information about Paton, the Newark office as-
signed an agent to investigate her. The agent pursued information
about the Paton family through the local credit bureau and the lo-
cal chief of police and eventually interviewed the principal and
vice-principal of Paton's school and learned of the reason for the
letter. The agent then wrote a memorandum recommending that
the investigation be closed because "she is not believed to be in-
volved in subversive matters."" 0
The FBI visit to the school became widely known through an
article in the school newspaper,"1 ' and when the FBI refused to
acknowledge that an investigation had taken place," 2 Paton filed a
civil action seeking damages from several FBI officials for violation
of her first amendment and other civil rights and a declaratory
judgment as to the unconstitutionality of mail covers. She also
sought expungement of her fie with the FBI."3
While ordering expungement, 1 14 the district court granted sum-
mary judgment to the defendants on the other matters on the
ground that Paton had suffered no legally cognizable injury." 5
Both parties appealed to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. The
court of appeals, while finding that Paton had standing to chal-
lenge the existence of her.file,116 held that the trial court had insuf-
ficient evidence of the FBI's interests in the file to order
expungement summarily." 7 More significantly, however, the court
also ruled that there was sufficient evidence of harm to Paton to
require full consideration of her claims for damages," 8 in view of
the legitimacy of private causes of action for deprivation of first
amendment rights." 9
108. 524 F.2d at 865.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 865-66.
111. The incident was also reported in the community and national press. Id. at
870, nn.12-13.
112. Id. at 866.
113. Id.
114. Paton v. La Prade, 382 F. Supp. 1118, 1122 (D.N.J. 1974).
115. Id.
116. 524 F.2d at 868.
117. Id. at 869.
118. Id. at 871-72.
119. Id. at 869-70.
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The circuit court made several findings of potential injury to Pa-
ton.120 First, it was noted that the existence of a file marked "SM-
SWP" (Subversive Material-Socialist Workers Party) might dimin-
ish Paton's possibilities for future employment by the government.
Second, the notoriety precipitated by the widespread publicity
given to the investigation might adversely affect Paton's standing
in the community. Third, the possibility of psychological harm of
invasion of privacy had been verified by three social scientists who
had submitted affidavits concerning the types of injuries which
might be suffered by someone in Paton's position.12'
The court seemed unimpressed by the psychological evidence
presented, but it found the evidence adequate for the purpose for
which it was intended (i.e., to show sufficient evidence of harm to
deny a motion for summary judgment based on a ground that there
was none). The view of the court was as follows:
The possibility of... injury is confirmed by the affidavits of three so-
cial scientists submitted by Paton in opposition to defendants' motion for
summary judgment. These experts submitted opinions on the basis of
facts, supplied by Paton's counsel, that Paton had suffered or might suffer
in the future the types of injury alleged in her complaint: stigmatization,
invasion of privacy, interference with personality development, and inter-
ference with her freedom of association through the decision of others to
shun her. These affidavits may not have much substantive weight but
they may not be disregarded on a motion for summary judgment.1 2 2
Although the court did not elaborate on its skepticism as to the
"substantive weight" of the social science affidavits, it apparently
found the experts' opinions relevant to the issue of injuries.
Therefore, by implication the court concluded that, as a matter of
law, expert evidence of psychological harm is relevant to private
claims of deprivation of first amendment rights to associational pri-
vacy and political expression. Presumably then, the court's skepti-
cism turned on the validity of foundations of the experts' opinions
rather than the relevance of the opinions. It is not clear whether
the court was specifically concerned with the scientific weight of
the opinions presented or with their probative value in the instant
case. It is noteworthy that the experts all responded to hypotheti-
cals. Thus, they gave opinions as to the probability of certain reac-
tions by someone in Lori Paton's position, not as to Paton's actual
state of mind. Their testimony was related to whether harm might
have existed, not as to whether it did. Thus, while highly relevant
to the motion for a summary judgment, general research on effects
120. Id. at 870-71.
121. The views of one of the experts consulted, Maxine Wolfe, are described in
notes 182-94 infra and accompanying text. See also Levin & Askin, supra
note 6, at 151-52.
122. 524 F.2d at 870-71.
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of invasion of privacy would probably be insufficient to establish
harm in a private civil rights action. The function of such research,
assuming scientific validity, would be more likely to be corrobora-
tive. Whether there is sufficient specialized knowledge about the
psychology of privacy in youth to assist the factfinder in a civil case
will be discussed later in this Article.
C. Territorial Privacy
The sanctity of the home and one's possessions is the most
well-developed principle of privacy in Anglo-American law. It is
specifically embedded in the fourth amendment which protects
'"people" from "unreasonable searches and seizures" and thus
guarantees "secur[ity] in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects."'123 The fourth amendment creates zones (e.g., the home as a
castle or bastion) which, except in cases of "reasonable" state
need, remain inviolate. In some sense, it provides boundaries of
the individual which the state normally cannot pierce.
The amendment's underlying rationale was eloquently articu-
lated by Circuit Judge Jerome Frank in his dissenting opinion in
United States v. On Lee :124
The "sanctity of a man's house and the privacies of life" still remain pro-
tected from the uninvited intrusion of physical means by which words
within the house are secretly communicated to a person on the outside. A
man can still control a small part of his environment, his house; he can
retreat thence from outsiders, secure in the knowledge that they cannot
get at him without disobeying the Constitution. That is still a sizeable
hunk of liberty-worth protecting from encroachment. A sane, decent,
civilized society must provide some such oasis, some shelter from public
scrutiny, some insulated enclosure, some enclave, some inviolate place
which is a man's castle. 12 5
Thus, the fourth amendment goes beyond mere protection of
property interests to a broader protection of personal privacy.
This principle was firmly established in Katz v. United States,126 in
which the Supreme Court held that the fourth amendment prohib-
ited electronically eavesdropping on a conversation in a public tel-
ephone booth:
One who occupies [a telephone booth], shuts the door behind him, and
pays the toll that permits him to place a call, is surely entitled to assume
that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the
world.
... The Government's activities in electronically listening to and re-
cording the petitioner's words violated the privacy upon which he justifla-
123. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
124. 193 F.2d 306 (2d Cir. 1951).
125. Id. at 315-16 (Frank, J., dissenting).
126. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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bly relied while using the telephone booth and thus constituted a "search
and seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
1 2 7
The Supreme Court emphasized in Katz that "the Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places."i 28 It announced that the
standard to be used in determining the scope of the fourth amend-
ment was not the nature of the property searched or seized but
whether the individual possessed a justifiable expectation of pri-
vacy. In the majority opinion, Justice Stewart seemed to establish
a purely subjective standard: "What a person seeks to preserve as
private even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitu-
tionally protected."129 However, Justice Harlan's concurring opin-
ion amplifying and clarifying the majority opinion has become the
prevailing rule. He said:
My understanding of the rule that has emerged from prior decisions is
that there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expecta-
tion be one that society is prepared to recognize as "reasonable." Thus a
man's home is, for most purposes, a place where he expects privacy, but
objects, activities, or statements that he exposes to the "plain view" of out-
siders are not "protected" because no intention to keep them to himself
has been exhibited.1 30
Subjective expectations of privacy are insufficient, therefore, to in-
yoke the fourth amendment; they must also be reasonable.
The double meanings of key phrases in the standards set forth
by Justice Harlan are troublesome in attempting to discern their
import. "Expectations of privacy" may, for example, refer to a sub-
jective sense that privacy is likely to be accorded or to a normative
view that one may legitimately claim privacy. Obviously, these
two "expectations" are not necessarily coextensive. Similarly, an
expectation of privacy "that society is prepared to recognize as
'reasonable"' may mean an empirical condition (i.e., if a survey
were conducted, most people would recognize the situation as one
in which privacy is or should be accorded) or an ethical judgment
that society ought to recognize privacy in that situation as reason-
able.13' Additional difficulties arise in identifying subjective ex-
127. Id. at 352-53.
128. Id. at 351.
129. Id. at 351-52.
130. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan later had second thoughts
about the first (subjective) prong of the standard. United States v. White, 401
U.S. 745, 786 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
131. Writing for a five member majority in Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978),
Justice Rehnquist appeared to adopt both meanings of "reasonable" in his
explication of a standard of "legitimate expectation of privacy": "Legitima-
tion of expectations of privacy by law must have a source outside of the
Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal prop-
erty law or to understandings that are recognized and permitted by society."
Id. at 144, n.12 (emphasis added). The latter prong may be read to corre-
1983]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
pectations of privacy. There is good reason to doubt the wisdom of
a purely subjective definition of expectations of privacy. Such a
definition allows privacy expectations to be easily extinguished. If,
for example, one believed that police were going to engage in drag-
net searches, including, potentially, one's own home, the subjec-
tive expectation of privacy would be effectively diminished.
Nonetheless, the fourth amendment, in its plain meaning, would
prohibit such activity. Or, to use the facts of Katz, presumably the
police could destroy subjective expectations of privacy by an-
nouncing that they were embarking on a program of general sur-
veillance of telephone booths.132 Such a result would clearly
contravene the history and spirit of the fourth amendment.
To the extent, though, that a subjective standard is embedded
in definitions either of "expectations" or of "reasonable," psychol-
ogy obviously becomes relevant. Presumably a clinical approach
to the individual's thoughts in guarding/not guarding privacy
would be relevant to psychological "expectations." Perhaps more
defensibly, psychological research might illuminate social consen-
sus concerning the situations which are or "reasonably" should be
private. However, as Professors Levin and Askin have pointed out,
the Supreme Court has tended to ignore behavioral-science re-
search about the "social facts" underlying its analyses of the appli-
cation of the fourth amendment. 3 3 The one exception identified
by Levin and Askin was Terry v. Ohio,134 in which the Court held
that police may stop, question, and frisk individuals who the officer
reasonably suspects may be armed and dangerous. Parties on
both sides had presented evidence on the relevant social facts
which were: the social needs for stop-and-frisk options (e.g., the
dangers of the police job and the effectiveness of precautionary
frisks) and the psychosocial impact (e.g., community hostility to-
wards the police engendered by invasions of privacy). The Court
took those factors into account in constructing a rule designed to
balance the need for personal privacy with the need to maintain
spond to judgments of social consensus. However, it should be noted that
Rehnquist emphasized the expectation of privacy which he argued properly
flows from possessory interests. Citing Blackstone, Justice Rehnquist noted
that property brings with it the right to exclude others and, accordingly, a
legitimate expectation of privacy. Id. Thus, his opinion emphasized historical
legal bounds of property interests and neglected common understandings of
the bounds of "private" situations. In fact, the Rakas majority emphasized
ownership to such an extent that Justice White, writing for the dissenters,
characterized the Court's holding as applying the fourth amendment to
"property, not people." Id. at 156 (White, J., dissenting).
132. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MwN. L, REv. 349, 384
(1974).
133. Levin & Askin, supra note 6, at 140-42.
134. 392 U.S. 1 (1967).
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police officers' own safety. However, in view of the fact that only
two extralegal sources were cited in Terry,135 Levin and Askin may
be overly generous in describing the weight actually given the em-
pirical evidence by the Supreme Court in that case.
1. Cases Involving Minors
Because of the ambiguity of the fourth amendment standards,
the question of what privacy interests are within the scope of the
amendment is a notoriously difficult one which has resulted in par-
ticularly hoary rules.13 6 Midst this general complexity, the ques-
tion of the circumstances under which minors are protected by the
fourth amendment adds the dimension of who as well as what is to
be protected. 3 7 The Supreme Court has yet to rule on the applica-
bility of the fourth amendment to school children, and state courts
have resolved the question with differing results. 3 8
The question of the scope of the fourth amendment for minors
has been most starkly raised in two recent cases concerning the
use of trained dogs in blanket searches of public school students to
detect odors of illicit drugs. 39 These cases involve invasions of
both the privacy of the person (i.e., bodily privacy) and privacy of
space (e.g., lockers and purses).140 They are discussed here be-
cause of the nature of the issues raised with regard to students'
expectations of privacy under the fourth amendment; the key
psycholegal issue in consideration of privacy of place and
possessions.
135. Id. at 14-15 n.11 (citing President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Ad-
ministration of Justice, Task Force Report: The Police (1967) (noting the ten-
dency of field investigations to aggravate police/minority-group relations); id.
at 24 n.21 (citing Federal Bureau of Investigation Uniform Crime Reports for
the United States 1966 (providing statistics on deaths of police in the line of
duty)).
136. See generally Amsterdam, supra note 132; Slobogin, Capacity to Contest a
Search and Seizure: The Passing of Old Rules and some Suggestions for New
Ones, 18 AM. Cl~m. L. REV. 387 (1981); Weinreb, Generalities of the Fourth
Amendment, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 47 (1974).
137. Gardner, Sniffing for Drugs in the Classroom-Perspectives on Fourth Amend-
ment Scope, 74 Nw. L. REv. 803, 804 (1980).
138. See id. at 811-31.
139. Jones v. Latexo Independent School District, 499 F. Supp. 223 (E.D. Tex.
1980); Doe v. Renfrow, 475 F. Supp. 1012 (N.D. Ind. 1979), affid in part, re-
manded in part, 631 F.2d 91 (7th Cir. 1980), reh'g and reh'g en banc denied, 635
F.2d 582 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1022 (1981).
140. See generally Gardner, supra note 137; Comment, Search and Seizure in Pub-
lic Schools: Are Our Children's Rights Going to the Dogs?, 24 ST. Louis U.L.J.
119 (1979); Note, Use of Drug Detecting Dogs in Public High Schools, 56 IND.
L.J. 321 (1981); Note, The Constitutionality of Canine Searches in the Class-
rooms, 71 J. Cnme. L & CRIMiNOLOGY 39 (1980).
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The first of these cases, Doe v. Renfrow,141 involved the surprise
canine inspection of all the junior and senior high school students
in the Highland, Indiana School District. The doors to the school
were locked,142 and "students were instructed to sit quietly in their
seats with their hands and any purses to be placed upon their desk
tops while the dog handler introduced the dog and led it up and
down the desk aisles."143 The dog "alerted to" approximately fifty
students, who were asked to empty their pockets or purse.'"
What happened next "exceeded the 'bounds of reason' by two and
a half country miles":145
School and police authorities removed five high school students-three
girls and two boys-from their classrooms and subjected them to personal
interrogations and thorough, but not nude, searches. None was found to
be in possession of any contraband. Three or four junior high students
were similarly treated and cleared. Four junior high students--all girls-
were removed from their classroom, stripped nude, and interrogated. Not
one of them was found to possess any illicit material.14
6
Diane Doe was one of the students subjected to a nude search.
The dog had apparently "alerted to" her because she had played
with her own dog that morning, which was in heat. 47
To heighten what Circuit Judge Swygert termed an "extraordi-
nary atmosphere,"' 4 8 the dog handler was accompanied by police
officers and representatives of the press. 49 Nonetheless, in an
opinion joined for the most part by the majority of the appellate
court, 5 0 District Judge Sharp made an incredible finding of "fact"
that "[n] o incidents of disruption occurred in the classrooms be-
cause of the presence of the dogs or the teams."1 5' Regarding the
psychological impact of the canine inspections as minimal, Judge
Sharp concluded that the dog "was only an aide to... [a school]
official's observation of students" within the official's duty to main-
tain order in the school.152 He asserted that students have no ex-
pectations of privacy while they are in school:
Students are exposed to various intrusions into their classroom environ-
ment. The presence of the canine team for several minutes was a minimal
141. 475 F. Supp. 1012 (N.D. Ind. 1979), affid in part, remanded in part, 631 F.2d 91
(7th Cir. 1980), reh'g and reh'g en banc denied, 635 F.2d 582 (7th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1022 (1981).
142. 475 F. Supp. at 1017.
143. Id. at 1016.
144. Id. at 1017.
145. 631 F.2d at 93.
146. Id. at 94 (Swygert, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing).
147. 475 F. Supp. at 1017.
148. 631 F.2d at 93 (Swygert, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 92.
151. 475 F. Supp. at 1017.
152. Id. at 1019.
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intrusion at best and not so serious as to invoke the protections of the
Fourth Amendment ....
[T]he students did not have a justifiable expectation of privacy that
would preclude a school administrator from sniffing the air around the
desks with the aid of a trained drug detecting canine. The use of the dog
in this operation was an aid to the school administrator and as such its use
is not considered a search. Moreover, plaintiff as well as other students in
a public school, does not fall within the meaning of Katz because of the
very nature of public school education. Any expectation of privacy neces-
sarily diminishes in light of a student's constant supervision while in
school. Because of the constant interaction among student, faculty and
school administrators, a public school student cannot be said to enjoy any
absolute expectation of privacy while in the classroom setting.
1 5 3
Judge Sharp did find the nude search to be an unreasonable
invasion of privacy, 5 4 but he denied damages on the ground that
the school officials had acted in good faith.155 The Judge felt that to
suggest that the search was a "gestapo-like effort run by gestapo-
like people.., is to do an extreme disservice to a group of dedi-
cated people who carry heavy legal and moral obligations for pub-
lic education."' 56 The Seventh Circuit reversed only with respect
to the holding of good-faith immunity.157 A petition for certiorari
was denied by the Supreme Court, with only Justice Brennan
dissenting. 5 8
Renfrow has been cited in support of the premise that school
children are only entitled to greatly circumscribed fourth amend-
ment protection in cases involving school bathroom surveillance' 5 9
153. Id. at 1020, 1022 (citation omitted).
154. Id. at 1024.
155. Id. at 1028.
156. Id. at 1026.
157. 631 F.2d at 92.
158. 451 U.S. at 1022. In his dissent, Justice Brennan emphasized that the gross
invasion of privacy was inconsistent with the school's socializing function:
We do not know what class petitioner was attending when the po-
lice and dogs burst in, but the lesson the school authorities taught
her that day will undoubtedly make a greater impression than the
one her teacher had hoped to convey. I would grant certiorari to
teach petitioner another lesson: that the Fourth Amendment pro-
tects, "[t] he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,"
and that before police and local officers are permitted to conduct dog-
assisted dragnet inspections of public school students, they must ob-
tain a warrant based on sufficient particularized evidence to estab-
lish probable cause to believe a crime has been or is being
committed. Schools cannot expect their students to learn the lessons
of good citizenship when the school authorities themselves disregard
the fundamental principles underpinning our constitutional
freedoms.
Id. at 1027-28.
159. Stern v. New Haven Community Schools, 529 F. Supp. 31,36 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
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and school policies permitting searches of students' lockers.160
However, in a case involving facts similar to those in Renfrow,
Jones v. Latexo Independent School District,161 District Judge Jus-
tice argued that the Renfrow holding was misguided for reasons
similar to those posited by Justice Brennan in Renfrow.162
In Jones, Latexo school officials announced that they would be
periodically performing dragnet canine searches to ferret out illicit
drugs.163 The school officials kept their pledge. A trained dog snif-
fed each child in the school district. Children to whom the dog
"alerted" were taken aside for a search of their pockets.164 The dog
then was taken to the school parking lot for a sniff-search of the
students' automobiles.165 This procedure was repeated on several
occasions. 166
Judge Justice's analysis of the Jones case differed in three key
respects from that of Judge Sharp and the Seventh Circuit in Ren-
frow. First, he held that the canine sniff-search was in fact a
"search" within the meaning of the fourth amendment. As Judge
Justice correctly noted, the use of a sniffer dog to sniff the person
of the students does not come within the scope of the '"plain view"
doctrine.167  Specifically, Justice wrote: 'The dog . . . replaced,
rather than enhanced, the perceptive abilities of school offi-
cials." 68 Also, it can hardly be denied that a dog's sniffing-in fact
"slobbering"---on the individual in a search for contraband is in-
deed an intrusive search.169 It is arguably even more intrusive for
children than it would be for adults. 7 0 Second, while acknowledg-
ing that the standard for "reasonableness" of a search may be re-
laxed in the public schools,' 7 ' Judge Justice made it clear that
children do have legitimate expectations of privacy,172 expecta-
tions that cannot be eliminated simply by announcing that blanket
searches will occur. 173 Third, unlike Judge Sharp's view of dragnet
canine searches of students as benign at worst, Judge Justice ar-
160. Bilbrey v. Brown, 481 F. Supp. 26, 28 (D. Or. 1979).
161. 499 F. Supp. 223 (E.D. Tex. 1980).
162. See supra note 158.
163. 499 F. Supp. at 228.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 229.
167. See Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968) (per curiam).
168. 499 F. Supp. at 232-33.
169. Id. at 233-34.
170. "Such a tool of surveillance could prove both intimidating and frightening,
particularly to the children, some as young as kindergarten age, enrolled at
Latexo." Id.
171. Id. at 236.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 234.
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gued that such a rampant invasion of privacy rights is in fact a
threat to the purposes of public education: "State-operated
schools may not operate as enclaves of totalitarianism where stu-
dents are searched at the caprice of school officials .... Students
look to teachers, school administrators, and others in positions of
authority as models for their own behavior and development into
responsible adults."174 Accordingly, Judge Justice enjoined the
School District from using canine-sniffing in the absence of reason-
able cause to believe that the subjects are in possession of forbid-
den contraband.175
2. Psychological Issues
The analysis in the dog-search cases need not rest on psycho-
logical concerns. It would be sufficient to conclude the following,
for example, as a matter of law:
(a) Sniff-searches are "searches" within the scope of the
Fourth Amendment.
(b) Children are "people" with fourth amendment rights
which are not left at the schoolhouse door.176
(c) Searches without a particularized cause are per se
unreasonable, absent compelling state need. 7 7
(d) Dragnet searches of schoolchildren are, therefore, vi-
olative of the fourth amendment.
Such a syllogism is attractive both in its clarity and in the respect
implicit for the dignity of children as human beings. However,
such straightforward judicial analysis is unlikely in view of the
law's historic ambivalence about the status of children.178 Given a
relatively low standard for state need sufficient to abridge minors'
rights, a balancing test seems likely in consideration of the protec-
tion of school children from unreasonable searches. The child's
privacy interests are likely to be balanced by the traditional need
for protection and care of the child and accompanying emphasis on
174. Id. at 237.
175. Id. at 236, 239.
176. Cf. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) (children
have protected first amendment rights within the public schools).
177. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 n.18 ("demand for specificity in the informa-
tion upon which police action is predicated is the central teaching of this
Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence"); Gardner, supra note 137, at 844-
52 (people have a right to be free from unjust suspicion and indecent
intrusion).
178. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1967) (although juveniles are possessed
of fundamental due process rights, they do not necessarily have all of the
rights available to adults); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971)
(juveniles lack right to trial by jury).
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maintenance of authority of parents and those who act in loco
parentis. Consequently, there is a need for empirical evidence as
to age factors in the salience of various forms of privacy and as to
the psychosocial effects of honoring/not honoring the privacy of
children at various ages.
In Renfrow, for example, Judge Sharp implied a belief that pri-
vacy is subjectively unimportant to adolescents and that the ef-
fects of gross intrusions into their privacy are negligible. He also
implied that the socioemotional climate of the school would actu-
ally improve as a result of the dragnet search; the atmosphere dur-
ing the search was described as "light" and "relaxed,' 7 9 and the
search was assumed to have an effect on a disruptive drug prob-
lem.180 While Judge Sharp's views defy common sense, "hard
data" as to the embarrassment and anxiety engendered by the ca-
nine searches might have proved persuasive. Moreover, while the
absence of subjective expectations of privacy should not be con-
trolling, specifl5 data as to their presence might indicate generally
acknowledged zones of privacy and, therefore, better identify core
privacy interests which justifiably require protection.181 These
data should be collected for both adults and children of various
ages and backgrounds.
III. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PRIVACY IN CHILDHOOD
Consideration has been given thus far to psychological issues
raised in claims of privacy for minors under three constitutional
doctrines (penumbral/fourteenth amendment right to privacy,
first amendment right to associational privacy, and fourth amend-
ment right to security from unreasonable searches and seizures),
pertaining to privacy of body, information, and territory or posses-
sions. In order to put these issues in context, it is now necessary
to evaluate the state of knowledge as to the psychology of privacy
in childhood.
The available literature on developmental factors in privacy per
se is quite sparse. The most comprehensive analysis was per-
formed by Professor Wolfe,182 who relied in large part on research
179. 475 F. Supp. at 1026.
180. "[This Court] finds no fault with the school administrators using their own
senses and the sense of properly trained outside personnel and dogs to detect
serious conditions that are patently adverse to the proper administration of a
public school." Id. at 1027.
181. Cf. Levin & Askin, supra note 6, at 147-49 (analysis of psychological issues in
Supreme Court decisions on privacy).
182. Wolfe, Childhood and Privacy, in CHLDREN AND THE ENVIRONMENT 125 (I. Alt-
man & J. Wohlwill eds. 1978).
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which she had performed with Professor Laufer and others. 83
Much of Wolfe's work in this respect has been purely theoretical.
She has applied general principles of the development of peer rela-
tions and personal differentiation and independence, especially as
understood by ego-analytic theorists,184 to a developmental theory
of privacy. 85 This theoretical analysis has been enriched by data
from an interview study by Professor Wolfe and Laufer of 900 chil-
dren and adolescents, ages five to seventeen, about their concepts
of privacy, the only such general study of privacy in childhood.186
Professor Wolfe and colleagues have also examined the psychol-
ogy of privacy of children in a few special settings, such as a psy-
chiatric hospital.187 The only other study specifically of privacy in
childhood was of territorial privacy practices in the homes of a
sample of middle-class children.188
In her theoretical formulation, Wolfe paid special attention to
the significance of privacy in the differentiation in integration of
the self in relation to society:
[Tjhrough their daily experiences children and adolescents develop an
understanding of the uses and limits of interaction and information man-
agement in everyday life. They develop a sense of themselves as separate
from and connected to other, an understanding of the conditions under
which to see physical and psychological aloneness or interaction, and un-
derstanding of the possible range of such experience, and the uses of each
of these for selfenhancement or regrouping. At the same time, these ex-
periences give children and adolescents a view of societal norms with re-
spect to certain behaviors and activities and provide a way of interpreting
these as valued or not valued, good or bad. In this way children's exper-
iences with privacy feed back into their sense of self-esteem and help de-
fine the ranges, limits, and consequences of individual autonomy within
our society.18 9
Particularly for young children, privacy or the lack of it, is sel-
183. E.g., Laufer & Wolfe, supra note 10.
184. Ego-analytic theorists emphasize the development of adaptive mechanisms
in the child. They posit innate "conflict-free" structures which are important
in the development of the rational self. See, e.g., E. ERUCSON, CmraLHoon AND
SocmITY (2d ed. 1963); E. ERicsoN, INSIGHT AND RESPONSmLTY (1964); H
HARTMANN, EGO PSYCHOLOGY AND THE PROBLEM OF ADAPTATION (1958) (origi-
nally published 1939).
185. See Laufer & Wolfe, supra note 10; Wolfe, supra note 182, at 181-90.
186. Wolfe, .supra note 182, at 190-202.
187. Wolfe, Room Size, Group Size, and Density: Behavior Patterns in a Children's
Psychiatric Facility, 7 ENV'T & BEHAV. 199 (1975); M. Golan, Privacy, Interac-
tion, and Self-esteem (1978) (unpublished doctoral dissertation, City Univer-
sity of New York); M. Wolfe & M. Golan, Privacy and Institutionalization
(May 1976) (paper presented at the meeting of the Environmental Design
Research Association, Vancouver, B.C.).
188. Parke & Sawin, Children's Privacy in the Home: Developmenta4 Ecologica
and Child-Rearing Determinants, 11 ENV'T & BEHAV. 87 (1979).
189. Wolfe, supra note 182, at 189.
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dom volitional. To the extent that children are perceived as depen-
dent, they are subject to intrusions at the whim of their caretaker
into "private" places (e.g., one's bedroom), personal associations
(e.g., where and with whom the child has been), and information
about '"private" concerns and behavior. Only as children become
older does privacy take on a meaning of active choice in the man-
agement of interaction and information. Accordingly, as children
approach adolescence, privacy becomes important as a marker of
independence and self-differentiation. Threats to the privacy of
school-aged children may be reasonably hypothesized to be, there-
fore, functionally threats to self-esteem. Golan found, for example,
that children in single-occupancy bedrooms in psychiatric hospi-
tals were more likely than children in multiple-occupancy rooms to
experience chosen aloneness and that they had higher self-esteem,
even though staff rated the two groups as comparable in levels of
mental disorder and social involvement. 9 0 Such a result is consis-
tent with the literature suggesting that both children and adults
tend to be better adjusted when they experience personal
control.191
Professor Wolfe's interview data suggest that privacy is salient
even for primary schoolchildren, although, as might be expected,
the psychological components of privacy change as children be-
come older and experience a broader range of situations of per-
sonal control. For school children of all ages, "aloneness" is the
most commonly mentioned element of privacy, although it takes
on more significance as children move into late elementary school
years and experience less surveillance and a greater range of phys-
ical movement.192 Emphasis on control of access to place has a
curvilinear relationship with age; that is, it is more salient to late
elementary schoolchildren than to primary schoolchildren (who
typically do not possess such privacy) or to adolescents (who may
feel relatively secure in protection of private places). On the other
hand, significance of privacy as a reflection of autonomy is linearly
related to age, as is significance of informational privacy.
As the facts of Merriken and Paton suggest,193 control over per-
sonal information clearly has special meaning to adolescents.
Such control denotes respect for the dignity and personhood of the
adolescent; it provides the opportunity for the development of inti-
190. Golan, supra note 187.
191. See Melton, Decision Making by Children: Psychological Risks and Benefits,
in CHiLDREN'S COMPETENCE TO CONSENT 21 (G. Melton, G. Koocher, & M. Saks
eds. 1983).
192. Cf. Moore & Young, Childhood Outdoors: Toward a Social Ecology of the
Landscape, in CHILDREN AND THE ENViRONMENT 83 (I. Altman & J. Wohlwill
eds. 1978).
193. See supra text accompanying notes 90-98 and text accompanying notes 107-13.
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mate relationships and recognition that the adolescent now faces
decisions which in our culture are marked as "private" and belong-
ing to the individual. At the same time, informational privacy for
adolescents raises a dilemma. Protection of adolescents' privacy
shields them from scrutiny of illicit behavior. Professor Wolfe has
lucidly described the information which is thus protected:
Our respondents' descriptions of invasion experiences... change with
age, with the interruption of activities being cited less often as the child
enters adolescence. More of the adolescents, as compared to children 12
and younger, describe being questioned about their behavior and/or hav-
ing someone find out something they did not want known. And compared
to younger children, when adolescents describe these invasion exper-
iences, the information they have not been able to manage is more likely
to be related to sex, smoking, and drugs-all "deviant" activities. 194
Similarly, Melton found that adolescents often advocated minors
being able to seek psychotherapy independently of parental con-
sent because of the nature of the information to be discussed.195
The response of one seventh-grade girl was exemplary: "If he has
some problems and he can't talk with his mother, he should be
able to go to a doctor . . . . When you're 13 you start hanging
around in gangs and smoking pot an stuff. And you can't tell your
mother that!"196
Thus, there is danger that protection of adolescents' privacy
will permit their continued involvement in behavior which their
parents or society (as reflected in criminal or juvenile law) finds
objectionable. This risk is one which we gladly take in the case of
adults. Application of privacy rights (e.g., the fourth amendment)
ensures that the guilty will avoid justice in some instances, but we
are willing as a society to take that risk in order to protect individ-
ual privacy and autonomy. On the other hand, minors are not nec-
essarily recognized as autonomous, and both parents and the state
have been accorded considerable authority to "protect" adoles-
cents from themselves.
Consequently, the sort of psychological evidence on which rec-
ognition of privacy rights for adolescents turns, may often be more
general evidence as to the level of responsibility or competence
which adolescents exercise in making private, independent deci-
sions.19 7 Recognition of privacy rights for juveniles is likely to rest
on a balancing test between the assumed benefits of privacy-both
ethical (i.e., respect for individual dignity) and psychological (e.g.,
194. Wolfe, supra note 182, at 199.
195. Melton, Children's Right to Treatment, 7 J. CUINIcAL CHnn PSYCHOLOGY 200
(1978).
196. Id. at 201.
197. See generally CHILDREN'S COMPETENCE TO CONSENT, supra note 7.
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increased self-esteem; enhanced legal socialization98)-and the
potential harm of misbehavior which is protected by a shroud of
privacy of information and space. Thus, the psychological assump-
tions may be focused on the effects of the decisions themselves (as
exemplified by the abortion cases) rather than either the funda-
mental ethical and legal issues or even the psychology of privacy
per se.
There is one subset of privacy research which may have direct
application to legal issues, however. That research has to do with
developmental factors in the maintenance of territorial privacy.
While research thus far has been limited to the home,199 informa-
tion on both attempts by children to maintain privacy (e.g., circum-
stances under which children close the door) and respect by adults
for their privacy (e.g., circumstances under which parents knock
before entering children's rooms) would be useful in defining ex-
pectations of privacy, at least insofar as social practices are re-
flected in that concept. Similar research could be performed
concerning other settings, like schools and interpersonal situa-
tions, to determine developmental sequences in the establishment
of expectation of privacy of space and possessions.
The principal findings from research on territorial privacy in
the home by Parke and Sawin, and Wolfe and colleagues are, for
the most part, unsurprising.200 For example, it is of no surprise to
learn that parents are more likely to knock on the children's bed-
room and bathroom doors as they get older.20 1 The norms of when
such changes occur are also unsurprising (in this instance, the oc-
currence of puberty being especially significant).202 However,
some of the findings are more complicated. The variables which
are significant (e.g., sex) 203 in determining respect for privacy may
be ones which should be excluded from consideration for policy
reasons. Other variables require an "ecological" approach in inter-
pretation for which expert social scientists may be useful. For ex-
ample, house-related places are much more commonly cited as
"private places" by urban than by rural children,2 04 presumably
because of the decreased alternatives of places to be alone. Simi-
larly, as house size decreases and family size increases, "being
alone" becomes less significant as an indicant of privacy.205 The
198. See Melton, supra note 91, at 31-34.
199. E.g., Parke & Sawin, supra note 188.
200. See, e.g., Laufer & Wolfe, supra note 10; Parke & Sawin, supra note 188; Wolfe,
supra note 182.
201. Parke & Sawin, supra note 188, at 92-93.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 93-94- Wolfe, supra note 182, at 203-07.
204. Wolfe, supra note 182, at 210-13.
205. Parke & Sawin, supra note 188, at 96-97.
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implication is that, as options for privacy decrease, spaces which
suburban, middle-class people may regard as public may take on
meaning as "private" places for inner-city, lower-class children.206
Consequently, expectations of privacy are likely to vary with social
and physical environments. Their definition on a practical level
will require analysis of the social meaning of the possible attempt
to maintain a zone of privacy.
Another application this line of research may have is in cases
involving the fourth amendment rights of adults. In fact it may be
very significant in those cases where children have consented to
searches which uncovered evidence incriminating parents or other
adults. In considering whether the consent of another party is
valid, the Supreme Court has stated as the rule that "consent of
one who possesses common authority over premises or effects is
valid as against the absent, nonconsenting person with whom that
authority is shared."207 The question obviously arises as to
whether children can have "common authority" over the dwelling
or some part of it. Professor Weinreb has argued that children
should be presumed to lack such authority:
Reference to the privacy that one has rather than to the property that one
owns gives answers which we instinctively feel are correct. We should not
be surprised if a homeowner consented to a search of his living room in
the absence of a weekend guest; but it would violate our ordinary under-
standing of their temporary living arrangement if the guest admitted
strangers in the absence of his host. It does not startle us that a parent's
consent to a search of the living room in the absence of his minor child is
given effect; but we should not allow the police to rely on the consent of
the child to bind the parent. The common sense of the matter is that the
host or parent has not surrendered his privacy of place in the living room
to the discretion of the guest or child; rather, the latter have privacy of
place there in the discretion of the former.20 8
Professor Weinreb's conclusion may be inconsistent, however,
with the actual practices of families, in which, as he recognize, 20 9
the home may be divided into sections which are considered com-
munal or, conversely, "belonging" to individual members. The pre-
vailing law also recognizes that, under some circumstances, minor
children may retain common authority.210 Under such a rule, the
sort of research in which Professors Parke and Sawin have en-
gaged could be informative in distinguishing situations in which
minors might be likely to retain common authority from those in
which they cannot. Such research might also illuminate circum-
206. Wolfe, supra note 182, at 208-13.
207. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170 (1974).
208. Weinreb, supra note 136, at 60.
209. Id. at 60-61.
210. See, e.g., Gregoire v. Hendeson, 302 F. Supp. 1402 (E.D. La. 1969); see generally
Annot., 99 A.L.R. 3d 598 (1980); Annot., 48 A.L., FED. 131 (1980).
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stances under which children functionally have sole authority and
in which other family members cannot validly consent to a
search,21 ' although courts may prefer to recognize parental author-
ity regardless of the defacto distribution of authority over place.21 2
IV. CONCLUSION
Although most of the major privacy cases have rested at least in
part on psychological assumptions, these assumptions have often
been on issues other than the psychology of privacy. This relative
lack of concern with phenomenology of privacy per se is perhaps
unsurprising. "Privacy" is a complex concept, both psychologi-
cally and legally, and its application in a particular context may
more properly rely on logical than empirical analysis. There are
however, two types of cases in which direct consideration of sub-
jective privacy may be useful: determination of expectations of
privacy under the fourth amendment (e.g., Renfrow and Jones),
and determination of damages in private claims arising from viola-
tion of privacy rights (e.g., Paton).
It should be noted, though, that regardless of whether the psy-
chological assumptions made by judges were concerned with pri-
vacy per se, there was generally no systematic attempt to discern
the empirical validity of the assumptions (Paton being an excep-
tion). While this reliance on intuition and the "pages of human
experience" 21 3 is by no means limited to this line of cases, 21 4 judi-
cial decision making would be improved by attention to the rele-
vant research, where the analysis is dependent upon psychological
assumptions.
The utility of considering the psychological research available
is obvious with respect to the specific psychological assumptions
asserted in the cases described throughout this Article. Insofar as
those assumptions really underlie judicial reasoning, systematic
examinations of empirical data would be substantially more relia-
ble in discerning the validity of relevant social facts than reliance
on intuition or a notion of how the world should be. Perhaps more
subtly, psychology might contribute to an understanding of policy
211. See, e.g., People v. Flowers, 23 Mich. App. 523, 179 N.W.2d 56 (1970).
212. Cf. People v. Mortimer, 46 App. Div. 2d 275, 361 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1974) (parents
possessed common authority over 21-year-old son's room but not his personal
effects).
213. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979).
214. Cf. Bersoff & Prasse, Applied Psychology and Judicial Decision Making: Cor-
poral Punishment as a Case in Point, 9 PROF. PSYCHOLOGY 400 (1978); Melton,
supra note 19; Melton, The Family and the Mental Hospital as Myths: A Post-
Parham Look at Civil Commitment of Minors, in CHLDREN, LAW, AND MENrAL




bases which are so fundamental as to remain largely implicit.
First, psychology may help to delineate the meaning of privacy to
minors (and to adults, too). Such analysis may be useful in exami-
nation of the question of whether privacy law really adds anything
to substantive due process analysis. Is there something special
about "privacy" (distinguished from "liberty") that is particularly
meaningful and significant in consensual assessments of require-
ments for human dignity? If so, what are its parameters? Second,
the tenuous application of privacy rights to minors is apparently
based on doubts that they really are autonomous persons whose
physical and psychological integrity is worthy of protection. Such
ambivalence about minors' personhood is based further on as-
sumptions that minors are typically incompetent decision makers
who are incapable of free choice and who consequently are not full
members of the moral community. Consequently, general devel-
opmental research may ultimately be significant in determining
the application of privacy to minors. In that regard, it is important
to note that, at least for adolescents, available psychological re-
search does not support a diminution of rights on the basis of com-
petence alone.2 15
Ironically, then, if attention were given to the basic psychologi-
cal assumptions underlying policies regarding minors' privacy,
psychology might eventually be relatively insignificant in privacy
analysis. Rather, low standards for state infringement of minors'
rights would be abandoned, and attention would be given primar-
ily to the requisites for protection of human dignity. However, in
view of the fact that ambivalence about minors' personhood is
likely to persist, so too are balancing tests concerning potential
risks and benefits of recognition of minors' privacy. Hence, the
psychological assumptions about specific harms or benefits in vari-
ous contexts are likely to remain most salient in judicial analyses,
even if those assumptions are seldom critically examined.
In either case, there is ample reason to pursue a more system-
atic integration of the psychology and the law of privacy, particu-
larly with respect to minors. It is possible that the law can work to
inform psychology as well as the converse. It is noteworthy that
the work of Professor Wolfe and her colleagues was directly stimu-
lated by a study group of social scientists organized to provide con-
sultation on privacy to the Rutgers Constitutional Litigation Clinic.
Such interchange may make for more informed legal decision mak-
ing on questions of policy affecting minors and for more attention
by developmental scholars to the real-life concerns of children and
youth as well.
215. See generally Melton, Toward "Personhood"for Adolescents: Autonomy and
Privacy as Values in Public Policy, 38 Am. PSYCHOLOGIST 99 (1983).
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